Volume 09: Proceedings of 12th International Conference on Applied Energy, Part 1, Thailand/Virtual, 2020

Coordinated Pricing of Urban Electrified Transportation Networks: A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Perspective Yujie Sheng, Qinglai Guo, Tianyu Yang, Zhe Zhou

Abstract

This paper investigates the coordinated pricing of urban electrified transportation networks enabled by the dynamic wireless charging technology of electric vehicles (EVs) in the future. The in-motion charging demand of EVs will create stronger interdependency between the operation of power distribution networks (PDN) and traffic networks (TN). The PDN locational marginal pricing and TN congestion pricing will affect the route choices of multi-class vehicles (i.e. vehicles charging or not charging). The aggregated traffic flow and charging load of vehicles will in return affect the operations and pricing of the PDN and TN. To investigate the benefit of coordinated pricing, the Stackelberg game is employed to model the above interaction between the utilities and strategies of PDN, TN, and vehicles under coordinated and uncoordinated pricing scenarios respectively. Case studies demonstrate the benefits of the coordinated pricing of the coupled networks.

Keywords electric vehicle, wireless charging, distribution network, transportation network, pricing, Stackelberg game

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