Volume 47

Research on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Government, Automakers, and Consumers under Replacement Subsidies —— An Analysis Considering Automakers’ Charging Pile Strategy and Consumer Purchasing Behavior Xiancheng Luo, Lijing Zhu

Abstract

By the end of 2022, the Chinese government had completely phased out subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles and introduced replacement subsidies instead, aiming to promote the electrification of automobiles by incentivizing consumers to replace fuel vehicles with electric ones. This paper employs evolutionary game theory to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, automakers, and consumers. It analyzes the evolutionary strategies of automaker and consumer decisions under both proactive and passive subsidy attitudes of the government, coupled with system dynamics simulations. The study investigates the evolutionary stable states of the government, automakers, and consumers, as well as the impact of external variables on the strategic choices of the involved parties. Simulation results indicate that the government’s strategic choices at the initial stages of new energy vehicle development are crucial for the system to reach a positive stable state; operational revenues from charging stations and the utility derived from new energy vehicles are the primary drivers for automakers and consumers to adopt proactive strategies, respectively. This research provides a quantitative analysis of government subsidies to inform the optimization of new energy vehicle subsidy policies.

Keywords new energy vehicles, replacement subsidies, evolutionary game, system dynamics